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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
CASE NO. 14030
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal
corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION: OSCAR A. ROBIN; and
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation,
Defendants & Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE
These respondents agree with the a p p e l l a n t ' s statement
of the nature of the c a s e .
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The t r i a l court entered judgment in favor ef a l l
defendants and respondents, no cause of a c t i o n .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales Company
seek an affirmance of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment that p l a i n t i f f
has no cause f o r a c t i o n a g a i n s t them.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the a p p e l l a n t ' s statement of f a c t s i s generally
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correct, these respondents must controvert the same in some
particulars and it is necessary to supplement the same for a
full and fair completeness, all as hereinafter specified.
Let us start from the beginning.
The property in question was originally owned by the
State of Utah.

In 1949 the State Quitclaimed the property to

Ogden City, but in its Quitclaim Deed it specifically reserved
from the conveyance "all coal, oil, gas, mines, metals, grave1
and other minerals of whatsoever kind or nature in the above land/1
with the right to enter upon the land and remove the same. (Exhibit
B t£ the Pre-Trial Order» R. 355. (Emphasis Supplied.)
Next, in 1965, the Utah State Road Commission obtained
from Ogden City the option in question, Exhibit A to the Pre-Trial
Order. (R. 353-354).

The option is correctly quoted on Pages 3

and 4 of the plaint iff-appellant's brief.

The option was never

acknowledged or recorded so as to give notice of its existence and
contents to others who might become interested in the land.
The Trial Court found (Finding 1, R# 510) on the
uncontradicted testimony of Richard N. Griffin, of the State Road
Commission staff, that the option agreement was prepared and the
wording thereof chosen by the representatives and employees of
the Utah State Road Commission.

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Richard N. Griffin, the State Road Commission employee
who drafted the option agreement, called as a witness by the
plaintiff, testified without any contradiction that the ''special
stipulations" inserted in the option agreement to the effect that
the owner will be contacted and essential arrangements made lffor
each, or any, occupancy and removal of material,11 that all
stipulations regarding work areas "and any other pertinent
agreements" shall be made before entry on the property, and,
particularly that "the removal of any material coming within the
scope of this option must positively be removed to the ownerfs
line8 and grades/1 (Emphasis Supplied) were inserted for the
protection of the property owner (R# 585)•

Whatever the custom

of the Road Commission may have been in drafting such options to
include a provision that any materials removed shall be strictly
to the "ownerfs lines and grades," in this particular case, the
city engineer, with whom Griffin discussed the mattei; specifically
requested that provision (&# 757, 758), obviously with the idea of
of protecting his employer city and its successors in interest.
While Mr* Mike Gibbons, the plaintiff-appellantfs officer
in charge, discussed the option with Mr. Kimball, Assistant Ogden
City Engineer, and received verification of its existence and saw
a copy thereof, Mr, Kimball didn't recall even discussing the

.3.
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quantities that might be removed (R. 787), and after hearing all
of the evidence, the Honorable Trial Court found (Finding 3, R.
510) as a fact that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence either that Kimball had any
authority from Ogden City to specify or determine the amount of
material available under the option, or that Kimball or any other
officer of Ogden City agreed, stated or represented that plaintiff
would have the right under the option to obtain Four Hundred Ninety
Eight Thousand ( 498,000) cubic yards of materials (as claimed by
plaintiff) or any other amount of materials from the site in
question.

In February of 1966, plaintiff-appellant signed its

construction contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit M) with the State Road
Commission,

As conceded by plaintiff-appellant, the specifications

forming a part of the construction contract referred to possible
commission-heId options to purchase materials and required the
contractor, if he desired to obtain material pursuant to the
options, to "comply with and fulfill all terms and conditions as
may be stipulated in the option. . . • and shall notify the owner
of the property of his intent to exercise the option before
entering on the property/1

(Emphasis Supplied.)

There is TK> evidence in the record that plaintiffappellant ever

exercised or attempted to exercise the option.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the spring of 1966, as stated by plaintiff-appellant,
Ogden City entered into negotiations for the sale of the property
to Mr* Oscar A. Robin, who was the president and sole stockholder
of Hardy Scales Company•
Mr. Richard P. Reed, a Vice-President of the plaintiffappellant, testified that in May of 1966 he learned by a telephone
call from a local company employee (Mr. William Eccles) that the
City was reportedly selling the optioned property (R. 629-630).
Reed then called Mr. Kay, of the State Road Commission Staff, who
suggested that he check with Hardy Scales. So, as Mr. Reed,
testified, he arranged a visit with Clay Barnard, a local
representative of Hardy Scales and inquired about the availability
of materials.

Reed further testified that Barnard told him that

they planned on building on the site, but "that he could not give
me an answer what could be done. . . . he would have to talk to
his boss."

(R. 631-& 647.)

Mr. Reed testified that he then attempted to arrange a
meeting with Barnard and an architect, Mr. Piers, who was reported
to be working on a project for plans for the proposed building,
but Mr. Barnard did not come to that meeting. However, Reed
indicated that from Mr. Piers he "got the feeling we were going to
beat a dead horse on this property so far as Hardy Scales was
concerned."

(R. 631.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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However, instead of identifying and communicating with
Mr. Barnard's "boss" as suggested, Mr. Reed, as he testified, met
with the Ogden City Manager and some Counselmen at the Weber Club
on May 17, 1966, where, as Reed testified, the Manager, Mr. Hood,
told him that the city had made a deal with Hardy Scales and that
the property would not be available.

The city officials there

apparently offered to find substitute materials.

(R. 632 & 640).

Reed then told the City Officials that there were two routes for
the City:

(1) The City could break the "lease" (apparently an

accidential misnomer; the witness meant by this the deal with
Hardy Scales

(R. 653-654) and let Gibbons and Reed have the

material or (2) the City could find other material (R.633).

Reed

himself testified that he made no demand for performance of the
option by Ogden City (R. 640-641).

Mr. Reed said that he made no

threat of action on the option because the City, at that meeting
undertook to get other materials (R. 641), and no demand was made
on the City to produce the materials under the option (R. 645).
Reed further testified that as soon as the City authorities told
him there were other properties to get material from, his company
didn't pursue the matter with Hardy Scales (R. 646-7).

This was

on May 17th.
On May 20th Mr. Robin came to town and purchased and
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paid for the surface rights to the tract in question and the City
executed and delivered to him its Warranty Deed conveying the
surface rights to the property to

ff

Oscar A* Robin, President of

Hardy Scales Company1' (Exhibit C to the Pre-Trial Order, R. 356A357), and Robin, as part of the transaction executed and delivered
to the City his covenant and agreement, (Plaintiff's Exhibit D to
the Pre-Trial Order, R. 360-362).

As both documents show, they

were recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Weber
County, Utah, on the same day, from which moment, under the law,
plaintiff-appellant had notice of the contents of both documents.
The Deed to Robin from the City specifically and excepted
and reserved from the property conveyed "all coal, oil, gas, mines,
metals, gravel and all other material/1 and the right to prospect
for and remove the same. Mr. Robin testified without
contradiction, that it was his intent and purpose, in accordance
with an established practice, to acquire ownership of the property
personally» with the idea that, if the development proceeded, he
would make improvements and then lease the improved property to
Hardy Scales, the corporation.

The court found that this was the

intent of the parties, and that Robin personally became the owner
of the property (Finding 5, R. 511).
It should be noted that the testimony of Mr. Reed with

~7-
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respect to his communications with Clay Barnard were admitted
over the objections that there was no proof that Barnard had any
authority to speak or act for Mr. Robin, and that the court
reserving its ruling.

The plaintiff•appellant1s statement on

Page 9 of its brief that Barnard was "the only person in the
State of Utah dealing for Mr* Robin prior to his appearance in
Utah on May 19 and 20 to sign the contract ," is inaccurate and
misleading.

And the only evidence in the case is the testimony

of Mr, Robin that Barnard was an employee of Hardy Scales in
charge of its local manufacturing and sales operation but never
had any authority for that company with respect to any real
property transaction and never had any authority to represent
Robin in any matter and had never previously represented Robin in
any matter (R. 720-723, & 727).

Further, the architect Piers had

no authority to represent Robin in any matters,

Robin had never

even met him (R, 727).
Further, the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Robin is
that when he acquired the property he had an open mind on the
removal of some fill dirt, which could have improved his property.
He did hear from Mr. Barnard that a Gibbons and Reed representative
had approached him (Barnard), but that Barnard had told him that
they had to get in touch with Mr. Robin. However Robin never

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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received any communications from Gibbons and Reed on the subject
(R. 725-728).

Upon this testimony and the testimony of Mr. Reed

that he never pursued the matter of the option after the City
authorities indicated that they would find substitute materials,
the Trial Court found that Gibbons and Reed never communicated
with Robin to exercise the option or to make arrangements to fix
lines and grades for removal of material (R. 511f Finding 6).
While Mr. Robin knew that the City had a contract with
the Road Commission concerning the removal of fill his only
information concerning the same was received from Ogden City,
which drew the COVENANT AND AGREEMENT (Plaintiff's Exhibit D to
the Pre-Trial Order, R. 360 et seq.) in which he agreed that he
would give the Road Commission first right to purchase fill on
the same terms and conditions as the contract in the event he
should within One (1) year after the date of his purchase decide
to sell fill from the land.

There is, however, no evidence that

the City or anyone else told him that the contract amounted to
anything more than the "first refusal" in the event he should
decide to sell.

Obviously the City authorities gave him their

own interpretation of the option they had signed and that it did
not obligate him to sell any fill, as he could fix the lines and
grades, and the State or its successors had the burden of

-.9.
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approaching the owner to make all arrangements before anything
could be taken*

There is nothing in the record to indicate that

he had any reason to distrust the adequacy of the information
given him by the City Officials with respect to an unrecorded
document and which would require him to make an affirmative
investigation to ascertain the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth about this unrecorded document•

On Page 9

of the brief of plaintiff-appellant it is stated that as a result
of the refusal of Mr. Barnard and an architect considering plans
for building on the property to let Gibbons and Reed to remove
fill (not true, as above noted) "Gibbons and Reed Company was
forced to obtain fill material from other sources and incurred
increased costs. • .

fl
#

It is respectfully submitted that this

conclusion of fact is totally inaccurate and contrary to the
evidence.

The trial court, on the evidence, specifically found

that plaintifffs damages were not caused by any breach of contract
or any misrepresentation on the part of the defendants or any of
them, but were caused and resulted from the misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the plaintiff and its representatives with
respect to the terms of the option agreement and the effect thereof
and the failure of the plaintiff and its representatives to take
reasonable and effective steps

to exercise the option by notice
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thereof to Robin and the negotiation of a essential arrangements
for removal of material and the establishment of the owner's
lines and grades (Finding 7, R* 512). As indicated, the evidence
supports this finding of the Trial Court*
At the conclusion of the evidence, pursuant to Rule 15(b),
URCP, defendants Robin and Hardy Scales Company moved the court
for an order amending their answer and the Pre-Trial Order to
state as additional defense and issue that the option, Exhibit A,
was void under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-3, UCA,
in that it failed to state the lines and grades for removal, the
specific portions of the land and earth which could be removed,
or to fix the quantity thereof by any other measure, and hence
failed to describe the real property subject thereto on the
grounds, contemplated by the Rule, that all of the facts necessary
to the determination of such issues had been tried to and were then
before the court. The court reserved judgment on the motions*
(R. 793 & 796.) The court later concluded that its decision upon
the grounds included in its findings and conclusions made it
unnecessary to decide the other issues before it, and so it never
decided the motions or the issue involved thereunder.

(Conclusion

of Law 5, R. 513.)
No action was commenced against defendant-respondents

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Robin and Hardy Scales Company until plaintiff filed herein its
Second Amended Complaint on October 1, 1970, naming them as
defendants for the first time. Plaintiff then issued Summons
against them and caused it to be served upon them in the State of
California on November 20, 1970, (R, 59-66, & 67-72)#

The claim

against Robin and Hardy Scales is set out in the THIRD CLAIM (R.
63-64) of the Second Amended Complaint,

No where in plaintifffs

pleading does it allege that any of the business done or acts
performed upon which it bases its Third Claim were done or
performed within the State of Utah, nor does it attempt to allege,
even indirectly any other facts bringing its claim within the
special scope or provisions of the Utah "Long-Arm" Statute,
Section, 78-27-22, UCA, and following.
These defendants interposed as a defense the court's
lack of jurisdiction of their persons (R*74),

The plaintiff

served these defendants with certain Interrogatories (R. 78 &
following)o

These defendants objected thereto upon the ground

that the Utah Court had not acquired and did not have jurisdiction
of their persons so that they were not before the court, and until
they were before the court as parties, they could not be required
to answer Interrogatories to parties under Rule 33« URCP, The
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, heard and sustained
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these objections upon the grounds that the complaint failed to
state on its face facts sufficient to invoke the Long-Arm
Statute or to bring the defendants within the jurisdiction of
process of the Utah Courts when served in the State of California
(R. 104).
Thereafter plaintiff moved the Trial Court to determine
before trial the issues of personal jurisdiction of Robin and
Hardy Scales Company as raised by their first and second defenses
(R# 74-75) attacking the sufficiency of service of summons
outside the State of Utah and the court's jurisdiction of these
California residents (R. 118-119).

At the hearing on plaintiff's

said motions, on January 12, 1972, these defendants moved for a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (Court Minutes, R. 152).
after extensive arguments and briefing before the Honorable Calvin
Gould, District Judge, in which it was submitted, among other
things, that the ruling of the Honorable Judge Hyde determined
for the purpose of this action that the Utah District Court had
not acquired jurisdiction, Judge Gould denied these defendants1
motions for dismissal, but in his order specified that the question
°f ill personam jurisdiction over these defendants was to be
determined at the trial on the merits.
The question of jurisdiction over their persons and the
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question of the v a l i d i t y of the option agreement under the Utah
Statute of Frauds were reserved in the court's Pre-Trial Orders
and the amendments thereof.
As above indicated, the Honorable Trial Judge who
heard the case on the merits, having ruled that the option was
void for indefiniteness and that p l a i n t i f f had never e f f e c t i v e l y
exercised the same, and that these defendants had never
interfered with performance thereof, found i t unnecessary to
rule on these i s s u e s , on the ground that they were rendered moot
by the court's decision on the merits.
ARGUMENT
I

THE OPTION AGREEMENT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE OPTIONEE-DRAFTER THEREOF.
It is elementary and general law, followed in Utah,
that an option agreement for the purchase of land or any interest
therein is to be construed strictly against the optionee and
liberally in favor of the optionor, and this is particularly true
where the agreement is prepared by the optionee, as in the case
at bar.

91 C.J.S. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Section 8; Jensen v.

Anderson. 24 Utah 2nd 191, 468 P. 2nd 366; RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW:

CONTRACTS, Section 236(d); 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS. Section
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324. Note 98; and Seal v. Tayco. Inc.., 16 Utah 2nd 323, 400 P.
2nd 503,
Accordingly, the "option" before the court must be
construed most strictly against the State Road Commission and its
contractor, Gibbons and Reed Company,
II
THE OPTION AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF CLAIMS IS
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE, (A) FOR LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO THE
SUBJECT MATTER, AND (B) FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Upon inspection of the alleged "option" it is at once
apparent (as it was to the learned Trial Court) that there is
nothing contained in the option which fixes either the quantity
of material to be taken from the property or the location either
horizontally or vertically, of the portion of the overall property
from which such material, if any, may be taken.

It is no more

than an agreement to the effect that the parties will thereafter
agree upon the quantity of materials and the location within the
three-dimensional boundaries of the Twenty (2 0) acre tract from
which such materials, if any, may be taken.
Paragraph One provides a specific price per yard for
materials which may be taken "jLf and when this option is
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exercised,"

(Emphasis Supplied,) That an affirmative act

manifesting the optioneefs exercise is made clear by the "special
provisions11 and by a provision of the plaintiff fs Exhibit M (the
plaintiff's construction contract) which requires that if the
contractor desires to obtain materials thereunder he shall
"notify the owner of the property of his intent to exercise the
option before entering on the property," And in Paragraph Four
of the "option," consisting of special provisions, specially
typed into the Road Commission's mimeographed form, it is
provided that "This option i£ for the purpose of establishing the
price" at which materials will be available to the commission.
(Emphasis Supplied.)

It is also provided that "it (the option)"

shall also cover special conditions affecting the availability
and removal.

It shall not be construed to mean that the Road

Commission shall have a sole or prior right to all the materials
on the above described property. . . .The owner or his authorized
representative will be contacted and essential arrangements for
each, OR ANY, occupation and removal of materials. . . .The removal
of any material coming within the scope of this option must
positively be removed to the owner's lines and grades."
Supplied.)

(Emphasis

Of course the word "lines" refers to the horizontal

boundary lines of the area from which the owner may permit
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materials to be taken, and the word "grades" refers to the
vertical boundaries, or distance below the surface below which no
materials may be taken. And these words, as the Road Commission's
official, Mr. Griffin, testified^were intended to protect the
interests of the owner.
Inasmuch as the option specifically declares that it
does not mean that the optionee has a right to all materials,
down to the center of the earth, the question immediately arises
as to how much material is covered by the option. The only
answer given to this is the special provision that the owner will
be contacted and essential arrangements made for each or any
removal of materials and that stipulations regarding work areas,
residual condition of the property "and any other pertinent
agreements" shall be made before entry for removal of building
material, and that the removal of the material must positively
be to the ownerfs lines and grades.

It is submitted that it is,

under the circumstances, really too clear for argument that the
location and the quantity of materials to be removed was, by the
terms of the contract, left to the absolute and uncontrolled
discretion of the owner.
The plaintiff-appellantfs argument that the court
should construe the contract as if it provided for the removal of

-17-
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a "reasonable amount11 of materials, to be fixed by the Court, is
clearly invalid and unsupportable.

It invites the Court to

substitute a new and different contract for the one written by
the parties, by striking therefrom the clear and unequivocal
provision that the removal of any material must positively be to
the owner's lines and grades, and to substitute for it a
provision to the effect that the material to be removed
in a reasonable amount t£ be^ fixed by the court/1

lf

shall be

Can the Court

imagine that if such a change in wording had been suggested to
the parties when the option was being drawn that they would have
accepted the suggested substitute?

Of course not!

And the evidence is that the requirement for removal to
the owner's lines and grades was inserted, not only pursuant to
custom, but because of a demand by the City Engineer, Mr* Kelly,
for the protection of the property owner*
the intention of the parties*

It clearly expressed

As this court has had more than

one occasion to observe, it is not the function of the Court to
rewrite the contracts of the parties who come before it*
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2nd 61, 362 P. 2nd 427.
In the second place, even if the argument of plaintiffappellant as to a "reasonable quantity11 could be adopted, it
still leaves unresolved the equally insurmountable problem
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of

determining the location and the area of the particular portion
or portions of the Twenty

(2 0) acre tract from which Gibbons and

Reed would be permitted to take materials if[ and when the
quantities of materials have been fixed by the owner.
It is abundantly clear that the Honorable Trial Court
was correct in concluding that the porported option is void for
uncertainty, as there are no standards whatsoever by which the
intention of the parties as to the quantity or place of removal can
be determined, both of these necessary factors being left for
future determination by the owner at his uncontrolled discretion
or whim.

See 17. CJS Contracts« Section 36(2)e and 17 Am Jur, 2nd,

Contracts» Section 81.
1066, Section £•

See also the annotation at 21^ ALR 2nd

And it is the accepted rule in Utah that a

contract is unenforceable where the particular portion of a
larger tract of land, which portion is to be the subject of a
contract, is not definitely ascertainable, and that a contract is
equally void and unenforceable where the quantity of subject
matter cannot be definitely ascertained from the contract.
Pitcher v. Lauritzen, !L8 Utah 2nd 368. 423 Pac. 2nd 491, and Owyhee«
Inc., v. Robins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2nd 181» 407 Pac« 2nd 565/
See also Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Company» £ Utah 74,, 9£,
holding a contract unenforceable where it binds one party, but not
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the other party, who could ignore it at his pleasure.
The so-called option is also void and unenforceable
because it fails to satisfy the requirements of Utah's Statute
of Frauds, Sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-3, UCA,
It is established in Utah, as elsewhere, that an option
to purchase is an interest in real estate and within the Statute
of Frauds.

Coombs v# Ouzounlan, 24 Utah 2nd 39, 465 Pac. 2nd

356, and Knight v. Chamberlain, £ Utah 2nd 394, 315 Pac. 2nd 273,
275.
Perhaps it should also be noted that the right purported
to be granted in the option to remove soil, sand and gravel from
the city's land is an interest in real property, a "profit a
prendre,11 and within the scope of the Statute of Frauds.
Ballentinefs Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Page 1005; 72 Am Jur
Statute of Frauds,
2nd,/Section 51; and 34, Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Profit a prendre, Page 441.

It is the established law in Utah, as

elsewhere, that a written memorandum of a contract for the sale
of any interest in lands, in order to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, must contain "a definite agreement as to the extent and
boundaries of the property11 subject to the contract.
Supplied).

(Emphasis

See Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 121 Utah
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412« 242 P. 2nd 578, approved and followed in a damage action
based on the alleged contract in Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah
2nd 291, 495 P. 2nd 814. In Blrdzell the court held that a
memorandum of an alleged lease of land was void because it did
not describe specifically and definitely the precise portion of
the leasorfs lands which was to be the subject of the lease. In
the case at bar it is clear that the material to be removed was
not all the land owned by the City, to the center of the earth,
and the uncertainty is therefore three-dimensional rather than
merely two dimensional as to the description.
If there were any previous doubts as to this
proposition it was laid to rest by the very recent decision of
this Honorable Court in Davison v. Robins, 30 Utah 2nd 338. 517
£• 2nd 1026.

In that case the seller signed a contract on a

prepared printed short form which recited that the legal
description was to be prepared by a licensed engineer after
survey, and that

lf

Land being sold consists of approximately One

Hundred Fifty (150) acres. . . ." It also provided that
^property in question is briefly described in preliminary title
report number U-102434. . . ., less any acreage reserved by
seller.

Offer contingent upon buyer's approval of net acreage
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description, . . . M

(Emphasis by the Court.) This Court ruled

that the description of the subject matter was insufficient to
constitute a binding and enforceable contract, as the seller had
a right to reserve any acreage out of the described tract, and
then the contract would be contingent upon the buyer's
willingness to accept the acreage which the vendor subsequently
determined he was willing to sell. The Court distinquished an
earlier case where the vendee had been granted power to make the
determination of the land which he wished to buy.

The case at

bar is clearly subject to the rule of Davison« because here, as
in Davison, it is the vendor (city and its successors) which has
the right to determine the lines and grades, that is, the
location, portion and quantity of the land affected thereby.
It is respectfully submitted that the purported option agreement
is totally void and ineffective for lack of sufficient certainty
to be enforceable and for failure to specify the location and
quantity of land and material to be taken as required by the
Statute of Frauds, and that the careful decision and judgment
of the Honorable Trial Court should be affirmed.
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Ill
THE OPTION, EVEN IF VALID, WAS NEVER EFFECTIVELY
EXERCISED AND NEVER BECAME A BINDING CONTRACT TO SELL MATERIALS
FROM THE LANDS.
It is, of course, an elementary rule of law, followed
in Utah, that while an option to purchase, if based upon a
sufficient consideration, binds the Grantor, it is not a contract
of purchase until the option is accepted and performed, but is
simply a contract granting the holder the privilege of forming a
binding contract of sale and purchase by proper acceptance in
time.

Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Company. 2£ Utah 173. 77

P. 758; Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2nd 317, 358 P. 2nd, 903.
«•
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The trial court found (Finding 7, R. 512) that plaintiff's
damages were not caused by any breach of contract or misrepresentations on the part of any of the defendants, but were caused and
naturally resulted from a misunderstanding and misapprehension of
the plaintiff and its representatives with respect to the terms
of the option agreement and the effect thereof, and the failure
of the plaintiff and its representatives to take reasonable and
effective steps to exercise the option by notice thereof to
defendant Robin and the negotiation of essential arrangements for
the occupancy of the property, removal of materials and the
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establishment of the ownerfs lines and grades to which the
materials might be removed. This finding of the Trial Court, is
amply supported in the evidence*
Of course, the appellant and its representatives, are
bound to know the established law of contract and operate within
its purview just as much as Mr* Robin, or the City Counselmen or
any other citizen, but notwithstanding that fact and notwithstandin
the clear statement of the purported option that materials, if
any, must be removed positively to the ownerfs lines and grades, it
merely made inquiries of unauthorized personnel in the City
Engineering Department and wishfully thought that they had an
oral resolution of the uncertainties as to quantity (but not as
to location) of the materials wished for*
The burden, of course, was on plaintiff to prove all of
the elements of its claimed contract, but it produced no evidence
that it ever exercised the option by notice as required by the
option and by its contract with the Road Commission, Exhibit M*
Plaintiff-appellant argues in its brief that the option was
exercised on May 17th at the meeting of its Vice-President, Richar
Reed, with the Ogden City Manager and some Counselmen. However,
as hereinbefore noted, Reed's own testimony is only to the effect
that the manager confirmed that a deal had been made to sell the
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property to Hardy Scales, and offered to find substitute
materials.

Reed testified that then, instead of demanding

performance of the option, he accepted the City's offer to find
other material*

In effect it was an accord and satisfaction of

any claim plaintiff might have had under the purported option,
and a release of rights under the option rather than an exercise
thereof.
Further, Mr. Reed testified that after receiving the
City's proposal to look for other sources, nothing was done by
Gibbons and Reed to pursue Hardy Scales or Mr. Robin any further.
These matters, be it remembered, took place Three (3) days before
May 20th when the sale of the surface rights in the land to Mr.
Robin was consummated and the Deed to him, with his agreement to
give the Road Commission first refusal as to fill materials on
the land, were recorded, giving notice to plaintiff of Robin's
willingness to sell some fill materials if the option were
exercised.
And it should be noted in passing that nothing done by
any of the defendants in any way hindered or prevented plaintiff
from exercising the option at or after the time of this meeting
by saying or writing to the City and to Robin, as required by the
option and constriction contract that the company exercise the
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option and request that the owner

fix the lines and grades,

which would determine the quantities, to be removed*
Notwithstanding the rumors it heard about a deal with Hardy
Scales, it could still have complied with the necessary legal
formality of notifying the owner and/or the owner's successor
that the option was exercised*

Whether through negligence,

ignorance or inattention it failed to do so and as a result at
best had an uncertain option and not a contract formed by the
required acceptance of the option-offer.
blame but itself for this neglect.

And it has no one to

Even if the conveyance to

Robin were a repudiation by the City, there is no excuse
whatsoever for failing to communicate with Robin and notify him,
as the successor with notice of the alleged option, that the
existing option on the land purchased is exercised.

NEITHER ROBIN NOR HARDY SCALES COMPANY IS LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFF FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE ALLEGED OPTION
AGREEMENT.
The Gravamen of plaintiff-appellant's claim against
Robin and Hardy Scales is set out in "plaintiff f s claims11 in the
Pre-Trial Order as drafted by counsel for plaintiff-appellant, on
Page 3 thereof:

-26 -
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Defendants Robin and Hardy Scales intentionally
and willfully interferred with plaintiff's
rights under the option agreement, when, with
knowledge of its existence, they induced
defendant Ogden City to sell them the subject
property under a contract by the terms of which
said defendants were obligated only to offer
road building materials to plaintiff if they
decided to sell such materials.
However, the UNCONTROVERTED FACTS established by the
Pre-Trial Order (Paragraphs 3.d. & 3.e.) show that when Ogden
City acquired title the State of Utah reserved "all coal, oil,
gas, mines, metals, gravel and all other minerals," and the right
to prospect for and remove the same.

(Emphasis Supplied.) And

the Deed of May 20, 1966, from the City to Mr. Robin accepted
and reserved "all coal, oil, gas, mines, metals, gravel and all
other materials" and the right to prospect for and remove the
same.

(Emphasis Supplied.)
It is further uncontroverted that, so far as known, the

land in question consists of fine and coarse sand with some gravel.
Sand, of course, is basically the same material as gravel, the
only distinction being that the sand comes in substantially
smaller units or particles. Ballentinefs Law Dictionary. 3rd
Edition» defines "gravel" as "a mixture of sand and small rocks."
(Page 534.)

It also defines "sand" as "A species of stone. . # .

Disintegrated rock."

(Page 1138.) And Webster's Seventh New
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Collegiate Dictionary. 1970 Edition, defines "sand" as "a loose
granular material resulting from the disintegration of rock that
is used in mortar, glasss, abrasives, and foundry molds." Again
Ballentlne's Law Dictionary. 3rd Edition, says of "mineral":
'broadly, a natural inorganic substance forming a part of the soil
or crust of the earth."

It supplements its definition with a

quotation from Jeffrey v. Spruce - Boone Land Company (West
Virginia) 164 SE 292 as follows "In its ordinary and common
meaning, the word is a comprehensive one and includes every
description of stone and rock deposit, whether containing metallic
or nonmetallic substances; and where minerals are reserved in a
conveyance, if the ordinary meaning of the word is to be changed
or restricted, the language used must be reasonably clear to show
that intent#M

There is, of course, nothing in these conveyances

to show that the word was used in any restrictive sense, but on
the contrary the language clearly indicates and intent to use it
in the broadest possible sense, as it is explained that the
substances excepted were minerals or materials "oi[ whatsoever kind
or nature/1
Accordingly, it is clear that Mr. Robin bought only
surface rights and that all substances beneath the surface were
reserved to the State of Utah and Ogden City never acquired title
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thereto and never conveyed title thereto to Mr. Robin. And the
option is indeed reduced to an absuridty:

It purports to be an

agreement by the City to sell to a State Agency materials which
the State reserved and still owns.1

If Gibbons and Reed had paid

attention to the public records, with which they were charged
with knowledge, they would have realized that neither Ogden City
nor defendants Robin nor Hardy Scales Company owned any interest
in the fill materials in which plaintiffs were interested, no matter
what they might assume. And it must be remembered that defendants
Robin and Hardy Scales Company never signed any contract to sell
these materials to the Road Commission or its contractor; if they
are chargeable with an contractual obligation it is because they
acquired the subject of the contract with knowledge of the
encumbrance - and now it is clear that they never did acquire
title to the subject of the contract, that is, to the sand and
gravel constituting the fill material.

If Mr. Robin had acquired

it he would have been willing to sell the same in reasonable
quantities, as he testified, but he was never approached or asked
to do so* Nor did his purchase of the material
for Ogden City to perform:

make it impossible

after Robin had purchased the surface

rights, the City was in as good a position as it ever was to sell
the subsurface material. Robin had no responsibility whatsoever
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for plaintiff's failure to check the record title to the land and
so learn that the State, and not Ogden City or Robin, was the
owner of the subsurface material it wanted*
In the light of the uncontroverted facts the Trial
Court's findings to the effect that plaintiff's damages, if any,
was not caused by any breach of contract or any misrepresentation
by defendants, but was caused by the misapprehension and
misunderstanding of plainiff's representatives, who never
bothered to ascertain the facts behind or the legal meaning of
the "option," is eminently correct*
As above outlined, Mr* Robin reasonably and justifiably
relied upon the representations of the City authorities regarding
the contents and effect of the outstanding option.

Indeed, the

uncontradicted evidence discloses, and the Trial Court found, tha
the information they furnished Robin upon the alleged contract
was accurate, and that the so-called option merely fixed the
price at which materials, if any, would be sold, and did not bin*
the City or its successors to sell any materials*

And even if

Mr* Robin could be held to be negligent in proceeding to buy the
property without further inquiry as to details, he would not be
liable to the plaintiff under the principles on which the plaint
relies. The plaintiff cites and relies upon 86» CJS. TORTS Sectic
43 & 44#

And yet that authority itself states positively that
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f,

Mere negligent interference with a contract. , • . will not

subject a person to liability, . , . Similarly, one does not
induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person
when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with
knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract
with the third person, • • .,f Ibid, , Section 44, Notes 4 & 7.,
The same work states;
f

ln order that the interference may constitute
a tort, the contract must be valid, and contracts void for illegallity, or by reason of
repugnance to public policy, have been held
not to be within the rule extending protection
against interference with existing contractual
rights." Ibid,, Notes 13 & 14.
In Soter v, Wasatch Development Corporation, 21 Utah 2nd

224, 443 P, 2nd 663, this Honorable Court adopted the general rule
as to the necessary elements of a cause of action for interference
with a contract.

The court said:

"In order to establish a right to recover on
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would
have to show that the defendants, without
justification, b£ some wrongful and malicious
act, interferred with the plaintiffs1 right
of contract and that actual damage resulted,
(Emphasis Supplied,)
Here there is no allegation and no proof that either
Robin or Hardy Scales acted wrongfully or maliciously; on the
contrary all of the evidence is that they acted in entire good
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faith and with the intention of according to the Road Commission
and its successors any and all rights they might have. Even if
it should be considered that malice should be inferred from an
intentional interference with a contract right without
justification or excuse, here there is no proof whatever that Mr.
Robin or his company intended by the purchase of an interest in
the land to interfere with the option contract.

The evidence is

to the contrary, and the plaintiff caused its own damages by
walking away from the option, even when told by Clay Barnard that
plaintiff should see his boss (Mr. Robin) about materials.
Neither is there sufficient, or any evidence that Robin
acted with knowledge that there was an effective option contract.
In order to charge Robin with a tort, it must be proven that he
had actual knowledge of the contract, and the proof is only that
he had knowledge there was some contract, relating to the
materials, and that he should give the Commission the first
refusal on any materials sold.
Finally, as the Trial Court properly concluded, there
was

££ v&lid contract in existence and no rights based thereon

with which Mr, Robin could have interferred.

And Robin never

acquired title to the materials in question and hence he could not
have sold them even if he had been asked to sell them and had
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wanted to sell them.

For him to sell them would have been a

conversion of property reserved and belonging to the State of
Utah.
And, of course, equity cannot and will not impose upon
Mr. Robin the obligation to sell materials he never contracted to
sell and which he never owned or acquired.

It is respectfully

submitted that under the evidence and the law the plaintiff has
failed to prove a valid option contract for the sale of the
materials, that the obligations of such contract were imposed
upon Robin or Hardy Scales, that they or either of them breached
the contract, or that they or either of them induced Ogden City
to breach the contract.
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of defendants, on the
merits, is correct and should be affirmed.
V
THE TRIAL COURT IN UTAH NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER ROBINS AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY.
The summons upon defendant-respondents Robin and Hardy
Scales Company in this case was served upon them outside the
territorial limits of the State of Utah and in the State of
California.

Plaintiff claims personal jurisdiction over them by
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virtue of Utah's

fl

Long-Arm Statute," Sections 78-27-22, and

following, UjCA. No where in its complaint against these
defendants does the plaintiff plead or attempt to plead that
these defendants did any of the acts enumerated in the Statute by
which they would submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Utah, as set out in Section 78-27-24, UCA,
notwithstanding the provision of Section 78-27-26, UCA,
that "Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
over him is based upon this act/1

In other words, the plaintiff

has failed to plead the facts which it apparently claims would,
under the law, vest the Utah Trial Court with the extraordinary
power and authority of obtaining personal jurisdiction by service
of process upon a defendant outside the State of Utah and within
territory over which the Utah Court has no jurisdiction.
Appearing specially, these defendants objected to
plaintifffs Interrogatories propounded to them as parties defendai
upon the ground

that, without pleading the jurisdictional facts

justifying extraterritorial service of process, the service was a
nullity, and the court had no jurisdiction over the persons of
these defendants to require answer to the interrogatories. Judge
Hyde sustained these objections upon the grounds stated (R. 104).
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These defendants then raised the same defenses of invalid service
of summons and of lack of jurisdiction over their persons in the
first two defenses set out in their answer*

Of course these

defenses were not waived because joined with other defenses in
the action.

Rule 12(b). URCP*

On plaintiff's motion to determine these defenses in
advance of the other issues, Judge Gould, in effect reversing his
fellow Judge Hyde, overruled these defenses and denied the
defendants motions for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the
person, specifying however that this question was reserved and
should be determined at the trial on the merits* As hereinbefore
indicated, it never was fully determined*
Generally service of process outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court is a nullity, for the process
of a court ordinarily has no force outside its jurisdiction, and
the sovereignty of the state itself does not embrace authority to
control the manner of executing process to the extent of making
lawful any service against a person without the jurisdiction of
the state's court as a basis for a personal judgment.

21^ CJS

COURTS« Section 83, Page 125. & Section jtt*
It is axiomatic that where the jurisdiction of a court
is limited in any way, the burden is upon the one invoking the

-35-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jurisdiction to plead and to prove the facts which will bring the
case within the limits. This is true, for instance of Federal
Courts (32. Am Jur_ 2nd. FEDERAL PRACTICE % Section 168; and McNutt
y>» General Motors Acceptance Corporation. 298 U.S. 178. 80 L.Ed.
1135) and in the City Courts of the State of Utah (Hardy v.
Meadows. 71 Utah 255. 264. P.. 968,, and Mathison v. Poultry &
Stock Mineral Mining Company. 85. Utah 74,, 38, P_. 2nd. 741).
As indicated, it is also axiomatic that the
jurisdiction of a State Court is limited to the state boundary,
absent special circumstances which might extend that
jurisdiction into another state. Accordingly, as the Long-Arm
Statute under certain particularized and limited circumstances
specified in the act extends the authority of the court's process
beyond the place where it has general jurisdiction, the burden is
on the plaintiff here to plead in its complaint (which it has not
done), and to prove that these defendants did acts within the
State of Utah which bring them within the limited purview of the
Long-Arm Statute. McKanna v. Edgar (1965, Texas) 388 SW 2nd 927;
Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corporation (CA 9th) 383 F. 2nd 634;
and

Lebensfeld v. Tuch, 252 NYS 2nd 594.
It is respectfully submitted that the order of Judge
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Hyde, ruling that the service of summons upon these defendants
in California without pleading the facts bringing the case
within the Long-Arm Statute was void and ineffective and that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the persons of these
defendants, was correct and established the law of the case so
far as the District Court is concerned, and that it was error
for his brother, Judge Gould, thereafter effectively to overrule
and set aside the decision of Judge Hyde (Peterson v. Peterson»
(December 27, 1974)

Utah

, 530 P. 2nd 821).

And to compel these defendants, over whom the court
actually had no jurisdiction, as above demonstrated, to go to
the great trouble and expense of coming to Utah to try issues
with respect to which they were not before the court, and then
to defend an appeal upon the Trial Court's decision of those
issues, thus burdening the courts with unnecessary and ineffective
proceedings, was even greater error, which should be corrected.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the court below dismissing plaintiff's action as
to these defendants should be affirmed, and/or should be extended
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to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over these
defendants personally.
Respectfully submitted,

PAUL THATCHER, of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondeni
Robin & Hardy Scales Company
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